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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











WACHOVIA CORPORATION; WACHOVIA BANK;  
WACHOVIA SECURITIES, LLC;  
WACHOVIA SECURITIES FINANCIAL NETWORK, LLC;  
DIANE VAGILE; RONALD CACHOEIRA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:04-cv-03621) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 3, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 7, 2011) 
___________ 
 




 Laila Elmiry, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s November 16, 




her claims in this employment discrimination case.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.  
I. 
 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this 
case, we discuss that background only briefly here.  In November 2004, Elmiry, a Coptic 
Christian woman who was born in Egypt and came to the United States in 1978, filed a 
counseled complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey against Wachovia Corporation, 
Wachovia Bank, Wachovia Securities, LLC, and Wachovia Securities Financial Network, 
LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Wachovia”).  Elmiry, who had worked for 
Wachovia and its predecessor companies for at least 11 years prior to her termination in 
2003, alleged discrimination, creation of a hostile work environment, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, “common law” emotional distress, and breach of contract.  
Wachovia removed the case to the District Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  In 
October 2005, Elmiry, represented by new counsel, filed an amended complaint in the 
District Court.  That pleading, which named two Wachovia employees as additional 
defendants, alleged that Wachovia and the additional defendants had subjected Elmiry to 
a hostile work environment and discriminated against her on the basis of her national 
origin, ethnicity, religion, gender, and age, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against 




1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.1
 After the close of discovery, Wachovia moved for summary judgment.  On 
November 16, 2007, the District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.  In 
doing so, the court first dismissed the claims against the two individual defendants 
without prejudice, concluding that Elmiry had failed to serve them within the time 
prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
   
2
                                                 
1 As the District Court noted in its November 16, 2007 opinion, age discrimination is not 
covered under Title VII.  Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 465 n.4 (1982). 
 
2 Although Elmiry appears to argue that the two individual defendants were served 
through Wachovia’s counsel, this claim lacks merit.  The two individual defendants were 
not represented by Wachovia’s counsel, nor is there any indication that they otherwise 
authorized Wachovia’s counsel to accept service on their behalf.  As a result, service 
could not be effectuated by sending the amended complaint to Wachovia’s counsel.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4.  
  The court then turned to the merits of Elmiry’s 
claims against Wachovia.  The court, applying the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), concluded that Wachovia was 
entitled to summary judgment as to Elmiry’s claims that her termination was the product 
of discrimination and retaliation.  In doing so, the court held that although Elmiry had 
established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation, Wachovia had put forth a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment — she “printed” a 
client’s name in the signature block of a brokerage application without the client’s 
knowledge — and she had not shown that this proffered reason was merely a pretext for 




denied Wachovia’s motion for summary judgment, holding that there was a material 
issue of fact as to whether, in response to Elmiry’s allegations that co-workers were 
harassing her, Wachovia took action “reasonably calculated to prevent further 
harassment.”  (See Dist. Ct. Op. of Nov. 16, 2007, at 29.)  The court also denied the 
motion for summary judgment as to Elmiry’s claim for punitive damages. 
 In May 2008, a jury trial was held on Elmiry’s remaining claims.  At the close of 
the evidence, the court granted Wachovia’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to 
her age-based hostile work environment claim.  Additionally, her religion-based claim 
was dismissed and not charged to the jury.  As for her remaining claims — those based 
on her national origin, ethnicity, and gender — the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Wachovia on May 12, 2008.  That same day, the court entered judgment in favor of 
Wachovia. 3  Elmiry subsequently filed a pro se motion for a new trial, which the court 
denied.  She now seeks review of the District Court’s November 16, 2007 order and May 
12, 2008 judgment.4
 As a preliminary matter, we note that Wachovia has moved to strike three 
   
II.       
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 At some point before the jury retired to deliberate, the parties stipulated that the sole 
appropriate defendant was Wachovia Bank.  As a result, the May 12, 2008 judgment was 
entered in favor of that entity alone. 
 





documents that Elmiry submitted in support of her challenge to the District Court’s 
partial grant of summary judgment.  Two of those documents — handwritten notes 
purportedly made by a Wachovia employee and an excerpt from the “Merck Manual 
Home Edition” — were not part of the record before the District Court.  The third 
document — an expert report from Cheryl M. Kennedy, M.D., dated December 31, 20075
 We first consider Elmiry’s challenge to the District Court’s partial grant of 
summary judgment.  We exercise plenary review over that decision, and use the same 
standard applied by the District Court.  See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 
F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010).  Under that standard, Wachovia had to show that there was 
“no genuine issue as to any material fact,” and that it was “entitled to judgment as a 
 
— was not made part of the record until after the District Court had granted partial 
summary judgment.  Because none of these documents were before the District Court 
when it ruled on Wachovia’s summary judgment motion, we may not consider them in 
reviewing that decision.  See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Greentree Transp. Trucking Co., 
293 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that “an appellate court may only review the 
record as it existed at the time summary judgment was entered”).  Accordingly, we 
hereby grant Wachovia’s motion to strike, and turn to the merits of Elmiry’s appeal. 
                                                 
5 This report concerns Dr. Kennedy’s psychiatric evaluation of Elmiry on February 7, 
2007.  Although Elmiry seems to allege that Wachovia wrongfully withheld this report 
until after the District Court had ruled on its motion for summary judgment, the report 
clearly bears a date of December 31, 2007, and Elmiry has not identified any evidence to 




matter of law.”  See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 6
 As for Elmiry’s challenge to the District Court’s May 12, 2008 judgment, she 
alleges that she was not able to present evidence associated with her discrimination and 
retaliation claims at trial, which “severely weakened the case for hostile work 
environment and punitive damages and did not give the jury a true picture of all the facts 
and evidence required to fully evaluate the case.”  (Pet’r’s Opening Br. 22.)  Wachovia 
responds by arguing that Elmiry should be judicially estopped from making this claim 
because it contradicts the position she took before the District Court.
  In determining whether Wachovia met that 
standard, “we (i) resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the nonmovant, (ii) do not 
engage in credibility determinations, and (iii) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the nonmovant.”  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).  Having 
examined the record, and for substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s 
thorough and cogent opinion, we agree with the court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment in Wachovia’s favor as to Elmiry’s claims of discrimination and retaliation. 
7
                                                 
6 Rule 56 was recently amended, effective December 1, 2010; however, we will apply the 
version in effect at the time Wachovia moved for summary judgment. 
 
  In support of its 
argument, Wachovia notes the following:  (1) the final pretrial order reflected Elmiry’s 
7 Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting 
a position inconsistent with one that she has previously asserted in the same or in a 
previous proceeding.”  Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 
355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996).  Judicial estoppel is “an extreme remedy, to be used only when 
the inconsistent positions are tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud 




intent to seek to exclude at trial all evidence relating to her termination, (2) the final 
pretrial order’s “Plaintiff’s Contested Facts” section did not include any facts relating to 
her termination, and (3) Elmiry’s counsel agreed to the following jury instruction:  
“Plaintiff’s employment at Wachovia ended in 2003 for reasons which are unrelated to 
this lawsuit.”  (See Supp. App’x at 333.) 
 We need not decide whether judicial estoppel might be appropriate here, for 
Elmiry’s challenge to the District Court’s May 12, 2008 judgment nonetheless fails on 
the merits.  First, she does not explain how the District Court erred in excluding evidence 
that she herself seemingly wanted to exclude at the time.  Second, she does not show how 
any excluded evidence would have altered the resolution of her hostile work environment 
claims.     
 We have considered the remaining arguments set forth in Elmiry’s briefing and 
conclude that they are without merit.  Accordingly, and in light of the above, we will 
affirm the District Court’s November 16, 2007 order and May 12, 2008 judgment.  
                                                                                                                                                             
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
